Introduction
The Southeast Asian country of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has been embroiled in conflict. While this conflict has been present for decades, it has intensified in recent years, especially between supporters of democracy and the Tatmadaw (the military of Myanmar).
To add fuel to the fire, the ongoing Rohingya crisis led to a couple of flashpoints. The government of Myanmar viewed the Rohingya people as immigrants, refusing to recognize them as citizens of Myanmar. After Rohingya radicals attacked police in 2017, the military cracked down on the Rohingya people, forcing thousands to flee to Bangladesh (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2020). This flashpoint not only exacerbated existing ethnic tensions but also brought religious differences into the lens, with the mostly Islamic Rohingya people coming into conflict with the majority Buddhist government.
After decades of activism and house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD won a landmark election in 2015, ending direct military rule. However, the 2008 constitution ensured the military retained significant military power, creating an unstable balance that ultimately collapsed in the 2021 coup. As of 2025, the military has maintained its rule over the country.
While it may seem like the conflict and unrest have only been going on since the 2021 coup, or at the longest since the 2015 general elections, in reality, internal conflict has been present in Myanmar in some form since the British colonialism in World War II. The magnitude and scale of the conflict have fluctuated over time, with flashpoints such as the Rohingya crisis and the 2021 coup being examples of peaks in intensity, but the conflict overall has existed in some form for the better part of a century.
The Intractability of the Conflict
Many conflicts throughout history, including the current ongoing fighting in Myanmar, have been labeled as “intractable”. As a word, intractable means “hard to control or deal with”, and this idea can be applied to conflicts as well. Intractable conflicts are prolonged conflicts that withstand attempts to resolve them. These conflicts have been present throughout the world, spanning various time periods. Some modern examples include the Cold War, the Ukraine-Russia War, the Gaza conflict, and the Myanmar conflict. Their widespread presence has led to the development of intractable conflict theory, which details criteria for the intractability of a conflict and potential solutions to the fighting.
The primary factor that distinguishes intractable conflicts from “regular” resolvable conflicts is their aversion to resolution. The Cold War was a conflict that began after World War II and lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite peace talks between leaders and widespread fear amongst citizens, the conflict persisted for almost half a century, only ending when one of the adversaries dissolved. The conflict in Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014 (when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula), and efforts to stop the war have been unsuccessful so far. Negotiations, sanctions on Russia, and military aid to Ukraine have all been ineffective in achieving an end to the fighting. In Gaza, there has been violence since 1948, when the Israeli state was established. The recent conflict has shown no signs of stopping, with violence erupting frequently since the Hamas attacks of 2023. Finally, conflict has been on-and-off in Myanmar ever since it was granted independence in 1948, after over a century of British rule. Even after a brief period of democracy, the military junta resumed control in 2021, and there have not been signs of stopping since.
Intractable Conflict Theory
Looking at the Myanmar conflict from the perspective of intractable conflict theory, there is a lot to unpack. Part of this is due to the diversity of characteristics of intractable conflicts, and part of it is also due to the complexities of the Myanmar conflict. There is no single definition of what makes a conflict intractable. In addition, many characteristics of intractable conflicts are not binary, or black and white, but rather on a sliding scale where factors cannot be simply defined as present or absent. The list of qualities of intractable conflicts is extensive, but can be grouped into four distinct categories: causes of the conflict, nature of the conflict, relationships and social divisions, and consequences of the conflict.
Although not the main focus of this paper, understanding intractable conflict theory reveals its lack of efficacy in pinpointing the specific causes of the Myanmar conflict. Intractable conflict theory is so broad that it can apply to a wide range of conflicts that have little in common.
For instance, its proposed causes are overinclusive. These can include identity differences (ethnic, religious, or national), historical oppression and inequality, and shifts in power or power vacuums (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000, pp. 534–538). These differences and injustices are often passed down through generations, which exacerbate friction and increase the severity of the conflict (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000, p. 534). Therefore, it is evident that many conflicts can be labeled intractable.
The dynamics of intractable conflicts are similarly vague. Intractable conflicts are typically characterized as having no clear beginning, middle, or end (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000, p. 537). Additionally, they can be caused by numerous factors, with the specific spark that ignited the conflict remaining unclear. They are also described as undergoing rapid shifts, making targeted peacemaking operations difficult.
Relationships and social divides are another dimension that can contribute to the intractability of a conflict (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000, p. 538). Decades of conflict can foster stereotyping and a lack of contact, such as between South and North Korea. Generations have passed without many people knowing much about their neighbors. Colonial-era divisions, such as the Belgian colonialization of Rwanda, can also lead to intractable conflict, in which the structure of the Belgian colonial government led to a resentment of the Tutsi by the majority Hutu (Maron, 2019).
Intractable conflict theory also discusses potential consequences of the conflict. These outcomes are vast and include widespread trauma among citizens, desensitization to violence, escalating cycles of violence, and continued hidden agendas, all of which can undermine stability and peace, rendering a solution to the conflict even more complicated and difficult. As with the case in many intractable conflicts, peace can seem unattainable, especially when the conflict escalates and leads to extended cases of violence.
Altogether, the characteristics of intractable conflict, separated into its causes, dynamics, social factors, and relationships, as well as consequences, paint a picture of what it means for a conflict to be intractable. Consequently, intractable conflict theory also provides multiple frameworks and examples for the potential resolution of such conflicts: the realist paradigm, the human relations paradigm, the medical paradigm, the postmodern paradigm, and the systems paradigm.
These paradigms are numerous and often contradictory, from viewing conflict as a game to be won or a disease to be cured (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000, pp. 542–545). The breadth of the paradigms is a key weakness, since it fails to provide any specific diagnostic tools for a single conflict.
Drawbacks of Intractable Conflict Theory
So far, intractable conflict theory has presented a broad perspective on both characteristics of intractable conflict, as well as frameworks to resolve it. Both the characteristics and paths to resolution have been outlined in multiple ways. While there are definitely some elements of its characteristics and some elements of potential solutions that can be applied to cases of intractable conflicts, the absolute scope and range of the different characteristics that can be identified in intractable conflicts mean that many conflicts – even the vast majority of conflicts – can be classified as intractable, even if they really are not.
Apartheid in South Africa seems to have fit many of the traits of intractable conflict mentioned above – it was rooted in systemic oppression and inequality (racial discrimination and widespread racism), and was a conflict that manifested over the course of several generations, since it lasted from the 1940s to the 1990s, almost half a century (Britannica Editors, n.d.). Even though it fulfilled some of the qualities needed for a conflict to be intractable, the work of Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk famously brought an end to Apartheid.
Another example is the Rwandan Genocide. The Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups were at odds with each other for generations due to the Belgian colonizers’ deliberate segregation of the two, and this interethnic division continued for generations. In addition, the death of President Habyarimana led to a power vacuum that catalyzed the conflict. However, the conflict has been quelled since President Paul Kagame took power (Ferragamo, 2024).
Ontological Security: A Better Way to Look at the Conflict?
What both of these examples serve to demonstrate is that conflicts that have famously been resolved and are not intractable can still fall under the classification of intractable conflicts, since the definition of intractable conflict is so broad. Since the definition is so expansive and does not accurately reflect the actual status of intractability of a conflict, it makes sense that potential solutions to intractable conflicts are just as broad. The five paradigms describe intractable conflicts uniquely, and each proposes a distinct approach to resolving them. Not only does the definition of intractable conflict encompass all conflicts, including those that are not intractable, but the solutions outlined by intractable conflict theory for intractable conflicts are similarly broad and fail to pinpoint specific causes or catalysts for conflict. Rather than examining the Myanmar conflict through the lens of intractable security theory, which is too broad to offer specific suggestions as to why the conflict in Myanmar is so intractable, using ontological security as a framework may provide a more nuanced analysis.
The conflict in Myanmar has been devastating so far, resulting in the displacement of over 3 million individuals and leading to the death of over 75,000 (The Center for Preventive Action, n.d.). Moreover, the ongoing conflict has caused deep instability within Myanmar, evidenced by local human rights violations and effects on neighboring states. In 2017, the UN Human Rights Commissioner labeled the attacks on Rohingya communities as “ethnic cleansing”. In terms of the conflict’s effects on other states, the same attacks on Rohingya communities that prompted a response from the UN Human Rights Commissioner led to 700,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh. Extensive conflict in Myanmar can also have negative effects on its other neighbors – violence has the potential to spread across borders, and while the recent Thailand-Cambodia conflict was not directly related to the conflict in Myanmar, it illustrates the region’s vulnerability to conflict.
To utilize it as a mechanism for analyzing the Myanmar conflict, it is essential to understand the concept of ontological security. Originating in the field of sociology, ontological security is the idea of having a stable sense of self (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344). For the purposes of this paper, the term “ontological security” will be used as a metaphorical or theoretical concept, not an analytical one. Researchers such as Jennifer Mitzen first applied the concept to international relations. In individuals, ontological security is important because it gives people a sense of self that drives their ability to take action – even if maintaining their current sense of self is far from ideal. For example, someone in an abusive relationship may choose to maintain that relationship not because the relationship is inherently beneficial or helpful to them, but because the relationship has become ingrained as part of their identity, and breaking off that relationship could cause ontological insecurity or a lack of a sense of self. Individuals and actors can become intrinsically attached to their relationships and current situations so much so that they avoid changes in order to maintain a sense of identity and individuality (Mitzen, 2006, p. 347). In some cases, this can be beneficial, such as when an individual practises a healthy routine that not only contributes to their identity but also creates a sense of continuity in their life. However, more often than not, sticking to rigid routines, even though they pose harm, is not beneficial.
This also applies to states. Certain states seeking ontological security can become attached to conflict because it reinforces their identity (Mitzen, 2006, p. 342). For states, this can sometimes tie in with nationalist sentiment – an example of this can be found in the Southern Thailand Insurgency. The Southern regions of Thailand (near Malaysia) are home to ethnic Malay Muslims, who Thailand has assimilated into its culture. However, assimilating to Thai culture threatens the ontological security of the Southern ethnic groups, and instead of allowing themselves to be absorbed by greater Thailand, their desire to maintain ontological security has caused them to abide by rigid aspects of their identity (such as Islam), while the Thai government attempts to foster nationalism through shared religion (Buddhism; Rackett, 2024). The Thai government integrated Buddhism into its identity as a response to Western colonization attempts, which helped form nationalist sentiment, hence why the government values Buddhism as a piece of its identity. Both sides’ desire to stick by elements of their ontology without yielding to the other has led to prolonged tension.
While not the main focus of this paper, the example of Southern Thailand shows how ontological security can lead to intractability in conflicts – with both actors unwilling to compromise an aspect of their identity, friction and tension between the two naturally leads to conflict, and because those aspects of their identity are such well-established components of their ontology, the conflict continues for a long time and resists efforts to resolve it. In essence, a desire to maintain ontological security can lead to an intractable conflict.
Going back to the essential question, “why is the conflict in Myanmar so intractable?”, ontological security theory offers new perspectives that could provide more specific analysis than intractable conflict theory. Rather than looking at multiple potential causes of the conflict, ontological security theory pinpoints a specific reason as to why the conflict may be intractable. Furthermore, if ontological security is found to adequately explain the intractability of the Myanmar conflict, it becomes easier to diagnose and resolve the intractability due to the relative specificity of ontological security theory compared to intractable conflict theory.
Analysis of the Conflict Using Ontological Security
The first realm of analysis to look at with ontological security is the historical and identity-based roots of the Myanmar conflict, starting with the era of colonialism in the region. Myanmar fully came under British rule after the Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885 (Steinberg et al., 2024). Since then, colonialism under the British lasted until 1948, when Myanmar became a sovereign republic.
Britain’s rule in Myanmar mainly took advantage of religious diversity to erode nationalist sentiment and feelings of unity within the local population. The strategy that they used is commonly referred to as “divide and rule”, since the British took advantage of existing religious and ethnic divides and exacerbated divisions to consolidate their leadership, similar to how they ruled in other colonies (Rwanda, for example; Degterev, 2024). Muslim groups had lived in what is now Myanmar for centuries prior to the British incursion, and Muslims and Buddhists coexisted peacefully (Degterev, 2024). In order to prevent feelings of unity or nationalism among the colonized peoples, Britain purposely favored Muslim ethnic groups such as the Rohingya over the majority Buddhist population. Therefore, local Buddhists, including the majority Burman ethnic group, developed feelings of resentment and hostility towards the Muslims, whom the British elevated to higher government rankings and positions. This consequence of globalization, which, according to Kinnvall (2004, p. 745), “breaks down the protective framework of the small community and of tradition”, led to a feeling of homelessness in which both majority and minority groups felt a lack of ontological security (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 747). Furthermore, both groups have adopted the period of colonialism and the subsequent restructuring of hierarchy as a “chosen trauma”. A chosen trauma is an event that has had such a significant impact on a group of people that it becomes woven into their identity (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). For the Burman majority, their shift from rulers to subjects is a chosen trauma that contributes to their desire to re-establish themselves as the ruler of a Buddhist Myanmar, while ethnic minorities’ treatment under the post-colonial state can be viewed as a continuation of this chosen trauma.
When the Tatmadaw gained power in a 1962 coup, the synthetic divisions that the British established continued, albeit with a different hierarchy (Degterev, 2024). The Tatmadaw treated minorities like the Rohingya in a way that set up the treatment they receive today (Degterev, 2024). Under British rule, the priority treatment that the Rohingya and other Muslim groups received caused some degree of xenophobia within Buddhist groups. Since the coup of 1962, the military has used its power to target the rights of Rohingya Muslims, forcing many to seek refuge in other countries and causing the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state that prompted a response from the UN Human Rights Commissioner (Maizland, 2022).
The division caused by the British is one aspect that has led to a lack of ontological security in Myanmar, which is leading to the intractability of the conflict today. The impact on ontological security is twofold: the process of “divide and rule” affected the ontological security of both the Burman majority as well as ethnic minorities. For the Burman majority, colonialism disrupted their Buddhist kingdom-based identity. Even though they lived peacefully with Muslims, they were the majority ethnic group and governed Myanmar. When Britain reversed the roles and made Muslim minorities the primary governors of the state, it fundamentally deracinated Burmans’ feeling of identity, as their role as governors was suddenly replaced with a role as vassals to the government. Since colonialism, they have sought to re-establish ontological security by securing rule based on their Buddhist perspectives, rather than being forced to be subservient. Moreover, they have adopted a narrow vision of wanting a state based on a singular Buddhist identity. Thus, ethnic and religious diversity is seen as a threat to their ontological security, which could potentially explain the rationale behind the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.
On the other hand, the Buddhist majority’s process of restoring a Buddhist-led state is a threat to the ontological security of ethnic and religious minorities. The Buddhist majority’s desire to reinstate Burman leadership threatens the identities of many minorities, not just the Rohingya. A lot of the conflict has been between ethnic minorities and the Tatmadaw, with the 2015 NCA aimed at curbing the inter-ethnic conflict. The process of restoring Buddhist control comes with the tradeoff of threatening the traditions and identities of ethnic minorities – from their point of view, ethnic minorities want to maintain their unique sense of self without assimilating to Burman or Buddhist culture and ideology.
Both parties’ desire to maintain and restore their identity without the influence and shaping from external sources contradicts the mission of the other, and thus leads to the intractability of the conflict. For the ethnic majority, the ethnic minorities’ desire to maintain their customs threatens their vision of a Buddhist-led state, whereas for the ethnic minorities, the Burmans’ desire for a Buddhist-governed state threatens their individuality and history.
While colonial-era division has been the primary source of ontological insecurity, narratives pushed by both sides have been essential in prolonging and continuing the conflict, leading to its intractability. Both sides depend on narratives as part of their identity – the conflict has become part of their struggle to maintain ontological security. In order to maintain a sense of identity, both parties have continued to engage in conflict because it suits their identity. Continuing to fight maintains the narratives that they have carved out for themselves and supports the roles that they have grown into over time. At this point, it might be fair to say that conflict against each other is a part of their identities, and it has become an established routine that contributes to each side’s ontological security.
Firstly, the majority Burmans have developed a narrative that places them in a position of the “protector of the nation” and as defenders of Burman national identity to legitimize their power and to justify their treatment of ethnic minorities. In conjunction with this, they have refused to acknowledge the rights of minorities, such as the Rohingya, and have referred to them using negative rhetoric.
The Tatmadaw has portrayed itself as a protector of Burman national values by aligning itself with Buddhist groups and practices. Min Aung Hliang, the Commander-in-Chief of the military, has portrayed himself as a member of a lineage of honorable Buddhist kings, a lineage that has historically claimed to shield Buddhism from threats (Ford, 2021). Continuing this idea of Buddhist kings, the military is also said to be an institution that protects Buddhism from threats (Ford, 2021). The idea of these claims is to garner popular support for the military’s actions and help consolidate the idea of a unified Buddhist Myanmar.
In addition to the military’s portrayal of itself as a pillar of Buddhist values, the state-controlled media has drastically increased its coverage of military displays of support for Buddhism. In fact, news of public displays of military support has increased by 300% since the coup in 2021 (Ford, 2021). Additionally, news publications have run daily articles that illustrate military officials supporting Buddhism through donations, visits, and interactions with monks (Ford, 2021). Min Aung Hliang has also commissioned the world’s largest statue of a seated Buddha in Myanmar’s capital, presumably to strengthen the connection between the military regime and Buddhist symbolism (Aung, 2024). The military has also spread the narrative of the dangerous potential of a Muslim takeover of the country, linking the NLD to Islam. The Tatmadaw has gone so far as to link the Taliban with the Peoples’ Defense Forces, a group that opposes the military regime (Ford, 2021).
Overall, the military’s attempt to associate its regime with Buddhism shows how it is trying to foster a sense of collective nationalism and use Buddhist values and identity to back up its actions. This helps the Tatmadaw justify the conflict that contributes to its ontological security.
The military has also claimed that minorities such as the Rohingya are threats to Burman national security (Kyaw, 2024). U Thein Sein (a former President of Myanmar) is quoted as saying, “There are no Rohingya among the races in Burma. We only have Bengalis who were brought for farming during British rules.” This quote aims to undermine the claims to citizenship of the Rohingya, who are seen as outsiders and a threat to a unified Buddhist Myanmar. Military leaders have also often referred to the Rohingya as illegal immigrants to justify the ongoing conflict between the military junta and ethnic minorities across the country, particularly the Muslim Rohingya.
Again, this primarily serves to provide a narrative that justifies the military’s use of force against the ethnic minorities of Myanmar and that argues for a unified state under the rule of the Buddhist majority. The continued conflict helps maintain the Tatmadaw’s aggression, since it provides them with more reason to continue the fight to “unify and protect” Myanmar.
On the other hand, ethnic minorities have created their own narratives that serve to justify their cause and play a role in maintaining their ontological security. Ethnic minorities’ primary reason for their resistance against the Tatmadaw is to protect their individuality and ensure their survival (Gray, 2018). Padoh Eh Wah, a member of the Karen National Union (the Karen are an ethnic minority), stated, “Our grandfathers, fathers had to use military means to defend our culture and identity. Now we have to fight to have these guaranteed through political means.” Additionally, many locals from ethnic minorities have expressed discomfort at the “Burmanization” that is occurring across Myanmar (Gray, 2018). The government has passed laws that promote the teaching of Burman rather than each minority’s traditional language, which erodes their independence and history (Gray, 2018). The ethnic minorities’ resistance has become a routine that has been integrated into their identity. Their conflict with the central state, while destructive, has established itself as a familiar routine that supports their identity as defenders of their culture, which provides a form of ontological security as Mitzen describes it, even though it comes as a physical toll.
Minorities have been using this narrative to justify their armed resistance to the military and to justify their use of force in the fight to defend themselves against the process of “Burmanization” that threatens to dissolve their heritage.
Both sides have created narratives that justify armed conflict and resistance as a means to protect and further their respective identities. These narratives foster each side’s ontological security, and achieving the goals of each of the parties depends on preventing the other one from achieving theirs. Essentially, both sides are locked in conflict with no way out except if one side achieves its goal, thereby ending the aspirations of the other. Therefore, the conflict has played out as intractable, since neither side is willing to give in, yet both sides have clear narratives that aim to back up the use of force in the conflict.
Not only do the opposing narratives of each side contribute to their ontological security, but the conflict itself has also become a part of their identities. The conflict has been going on for so long that fighting against the opposition has become a routine, and the narratives pushed by either side are tools that they use to perpetuate the routine of conflict and fighting. All in all, the use of narratives from both sides only continues the ontological security dilemma initially brought about by colonialism, which extends the intractability of the conflict.
Summary and Conclusion
Overall, ontological security theory does a better job of explaining the intractability of the Myanmar conflict than other theories, such as intractable conflict theory. Whereas intractable conflict theory presents a wide range of characteristics, potential causes, outcomes, and solutions of intractable conflicts, ontological security focuses more on specific aspects of the two sides’ identity that have contributed to the intractability of the conflict.
The broad scope and range that intractable conflict theory discusses means that many conflicts, including those that are not necessarily intractable, are classified as intractable conflicts, and it is difficult to pinpoint exactly the causes and solutions that can be applied to a particular conflict. However, it does provide a comprehensive overview of the definition and meaning of an intractable conflict. Using the concept of ontological security provides an alternative lens through which the conflict can be analyzed. Focusing on the identities of each side in the conflict, ontological security is a theory that is able to recognize more discrete causes of the intractability of the conflict.
Ontological security analysis yielded multiple positive results in terms of investigating the cause of the intractability of the Myanmar conflict. Apart from suggesting British colonialism as a cause of the intractability, it also presented reasons for the prolonged intractability of the conflict (i.e., the narratives pushed by each side to justify the use of force). The initial cause of the intractability was the “divide and rule” policy under British colonialism, while each side of the conflict (Burmans and ethnic minorities) argued their own narratives as a way to justify the continued fighting to maintain their identities.
Ontological security certainly provides a more nuanced view of the intractability of the conflict, although it is clear that the topic is a complicated one that has been compounded by decades of history. Ontological security analysis has been an effective way to look at the intractability of the conflict, but, similar to how it was a step up from intractable conflict theory, there may be more specific frameworks that can be used to analyze the conflict in Myanmar. Perhaps comparing the situation in Myanmar to another example of ethnic and religious divide after colonialism could yield a more refined analysis.
Topics for further research about the intractability of the conflict in Myanmar could include a more detailed comparison between this conflict and similar cases of ethnic division or a closer look at how ontological security has played out in similar cases of conflict globally.
With the current situation, both parties are locked in conflict with no clear way for both parties to come out with a positive result. Policy to remedy the conflict will surely have to include stronger international support from both states and non-governmental organizations. Ontological security analysis can build on existing peacebuilding efforts with a more actionable framework. Compared to legacy viewpoints using intractable conflict theory, ontological security’s more specific perspective means that peacebuilding efforts can become more targeted and therefore more effective. The analysis indicates that a significant factor in the intractability of the conflict has been its role as a factor in both sides’ identities. With this in mind, peacebuilding strategies that focus on rewriting narratives and redefining routines could prove more effective than traditional efforts that concentrate on ceasefires and resource distribution. This could include the creation of a revised national identity, one not solely based on Burman identity, and developing interactions outside of conflict.