Introduction

The influx of Rwandan refugees into eastern Zaire [from this point Zaire/The Democratic Republic of the Congo will be referred to as Congo] in 1994 has been extensively examined in terms of mortality, scale, and regional political ramifications. An area of examination that has not received the same depth of analysis is how these refugees lived and survived within the structures imposed by aid organizations and local authorities, both legitimate and otherwise. This paper argues that the core condition for refugees across the period 1994-2002 was one of selective inclusion, where refugees were given access to aid, services, and some casual work, but also deliberately excluded from rights and protections that would allow for deeper integration. This sidelining resulted in militarized actors taking advantage of the refugees’ situation and further marginalization. This extended position of suspended legality resulted in the refugees being dependent on humanitarian NGOs, while still subject to the securitization of the Congolese authorities and other armed groups.

The period 1994 to 1996 was characterized by the so-called “mega camps” – enormous refugee settlements which were initially plagued by high mortality rates due to diseases. After NGOs stabilized the camps, dependency between the refugees and NGOs deepened and gatekeepers emerged to capture resources, while Congolese authorities ensured refugees remained within the camps. Later, as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire advanced eastward, the camps dissolved and refugees spread out; however, the basic logic of selective inclusion remained – assistance moved to mobile and temporary programs while state and non-state actors maintained restrictions on mobility and work. Finally, with the outbreak of the Second Congo War, there was an expansion in repressive moves by belligerents toward the refugees that made them even more dependent on aid from NGOs.

By examining these crucial eight years, this paper aims to expand understanding of refugee policy and management. This paper brings together Agier’s notion of humanitarian government and Buzan’s theory of securitization to argue that aid and security logics are not opposing forces but co-producers of selective inclusion. When combined with Castles’ insight that forced migration transforms social arenas, these frameworks reveal how humanitarian intervention and state security together restructured eastern Congo’s political economy and urban space. The end result was a system where a dual economy exists, where refugees barely survive in a legal vacuum while those with rights and legal standing reaped the benefits of humanitarian presence.

Materials & Methods

The progression of events that resulted in the vast exodus of Hutu refugees into eastern Congo is well known. Fearing reprisals, many Hutus (including many former Rwandan army and Interahamwe – a Hutu militia) decided to cross the border into the Congo and congregate loosely in an area around North Kivu Province. Huge refugee camps, like Katale, Kibumba, and Mugunga, rapidly emerged around the city of Goma (Thomas, 1994). This period was characterized by high mortality among the refugees (Goma Epidemiology Group, 1995).

This paper examines that uneasy equilibrium through a number of analytical lenses. Firstly, Michel Agier’s book “Managing Undesirables” (Agier, 2011) offers a critique and examination of aid organizations and NGOs that are given substantial leeway to manage and administer refugee camps through not only providing aid and lifesaving services but also arranging physical spaces, regulating mobility, and engaging in in-depth classification. This, Agier argues, is a form of government. By creating a parallel system of distribution and administration (clinics, cash-for-work short term placements, and procurement regimes etc.), these aid organizations inadvertently link the refugees to the aid organizations themselves, rather than to the people and context that the refugees actually live in. This creates dependency and alienation, which has repercussions in terms of social and economic integration.

Second, an examination is conducted in terms of state security or securitization. Buzan et al. argue that authorities often prefer to frame issues in terms of existential threats because this allows them to deploy the most severe measures of control (Buzan et al., 1998). The fact that there was not an insubstantial number of former combatants who had retained their weaponry in the camps, meant this was not completely unrealistic course of action. By securitizing and defining the camp outside of regular Congolese society, the Congolese authorities ensured that there was little social and economic integration between the refugees and local communities. These acts by the State were hardly unique, and a similar course of action was undertaken in Kenya and Ethiopia in terms of Somali refugees (Ikanda et al., 2025).

Thirdly, the forced migration of this huge number of people into an area of instability restructured existing social arenas – household, labor markets, urban areas, and political authorities (Castles, 2003) (Hilhorst & Serrano, 2010). This idea is crucial when examining what happened in Goma and its surrounds during this period. In effect, a medical and logistics emergency was gradually transformed into an extended occupation that vastly transformed the entire area’s social arena. This was due to both securitization by the Congolese authorities and the extended presence of humanitarian organizations. As Büscher and Vlassenroot argue, “international humanitarian presence became a significant factor in the recent shaping and reshaping of the city’s profile and has reinforced competition over the urban political and socioeconomic space” (Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010) The so-called “aid economy” became a fixed feature of Goma’s urban development and created opportunities for some groups of people (drivers, translators, contractors), while increasing dependency and exacerbating exclusion for others, particularly those refugees who were forced into the black and grey labor markets.

It is important to understand why these approaches to the refugee crisis in Kivu led to a kind of selective inclusion. To understand this, it may be useful to consider formal economic and social integration and how this would look. This type of situation for the refugees would include things like lawful mobility, work permissions, fair taxation, and access to the legal system and a regime of enforceable contracts (Carens, 2008). This was not the case in Kivu, where there was selective access to resources and opportunities and a withholding of the full aforementioned rights.

In Goma, for example, aid organizations looked to refugees as both beneficiaries and, in narrow circumstances, sources of labor. However this economic provision fell well short of building paths into the formal Congolese economy, leaving the refugees in a kind of economic limbo (Agier, 2011; Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010). The Congolese authorities on the other hand did take some steps to formalize the refugees in the country, through for example registration, but expressly excluded them from deeper civil and economic rights (Buzan et al., 1998) The key point is that informality and exclusion were co-produced at the intersection of relief policies and state security practices, rather than being merely residual.

Discussion

From Stabilization to Dependency (1994–1996)

In July 1994, aid organizations operating in North Kivu were facing an apocalyptic situation: refugees were dying by their thousands. The priority was flooding the area with as many lifesaving supplies and treatments as possible. Once this life-and-death situation stabilized, however, these organizations shifted to routine administration and aid distribution. The UNHCR coordinated with other NGOs to implement a response to the unfolding situation though efforts to standardize aspects of relief (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1994) (Chaulia, 2002). These strategies were successful in terms of lowering mortality, however they began a cycle of dependency and fixed the refugees in place, making daily survival contingent on the burgeoning aid infrastructure that was developing in parallel to the enormous camps. This meant that the same relief core that stabilized life for the refugees was also creating a system of dependency that would isolate the refugees from the Congolese economy and society (Borton, 1996).

As aid operations grew, money started to circulate within the camps. United Nations agencies and NGOs created a number of paid roles (guards, community health workers, interpreters) that provided some employment and economic opportunities for the refugees. However, this was by no means a broad inclusive process and access to these positions and the aid itself was controlled by former political and administrative authorities: “The continued dominance of the former leadership, some of whom were key perpetrators of the genocide, and the presence of armed elements in refugee camps, particularly those in eastern Zaire, inflicted more trauma, insecurity and diversion of resources destined for bona fide refugees.” (Borton, 1996, p. 27) Aid agencies walked a tightrope: they wanted to provide aid but in doing so they would need to go through these camp gatekeepers and run the risk of further enabling them. This led to ration manipulation and elite capture that further entrenched control of the camps. Many jobs were completely off limits to the refugees and besides needing to contend with the Rwandan political elite control of the camps, there were also 1500 Congolese troops hired by UNHCR for security (UNHCR, 1997). Another example of was in running the logistics and transport to and within the camps. Here, private companies were often utilized and they just hired refugees on a casual basis, even the hiring itself was tightly controlled by intermediaries (World Food Programme, 1999).

The casual basis for most jobs in the camps meant that, in practice, refugees were selectively included as aid beneficiaries and casual workers, but this allowance fell well short of any form of sustainable inclusion: long-term job stability, contract enforcement, and freedom of movement remained impossible. Even within such restrictive conditions, refugees attempted to exercise forms of everyday agency. As documented in studies of displaced populations in eastern Congo, including Bukavu and Goma, displaced people often participated in informal markets and petty trade to offset aid dependency (Binda, 2019). Informal exchanges emerged around food distribution points, and some refugees bartered surplus rations for charcoal or household goods. These micro-economies illustrate that dependency and resistance coexisted, as refugees reworked the terms of their selective inclusion.

Pressure against integration did not only emerge on the basis of economic dependency creation. Elements from the former Rwandan army and Interahamwe exercised substantial control within the camps through taxing aid, controlling employment lists, and intimidating people who wanted to return to Rwanda (Binet, 2025). The UNHCR notes that armed oversight within the camps was overt and made it challenging to separate genuine refugees from militants. The atmosphere of control was only exacerbated by the authorities in Congo, who viewed the camps as profound security and stability risks. When viewed through this lens, it is reasonable to take extreme measures to deal with the problem. This came in the form of extensive movement controls, enforced encampment, administrative barriers to formal employment (Buzan et al., 1998).

While the Congolese state during this period was itself in crisis, it developed a number of simple mechanisms to maintain control – police checkpoints, laws preventing integration (both social and economic), road barriers, fencing, army and police patrols and random stops (United States, 1997). This combination of a relatively weak state that was nevertheless able to exercise some control over refugees and highly militarized camps led to a potent system of social and economic control. This resulted in humanitarian organizations providing services and some wages in the camps and various power structures (ex-Rwandan armed forces, Interahamwe, Congo state police and military) containing and controlling refugees both spatially and legally. When combined, this created a cocktail that led to selective inclusion. Additionally, the huge settlements were always supposed to be temporary. As such, the authorities in Congo controlled refugee access to local schools and clinics. Employers and landlord who may have been willing to work with the refugees were likewise dissuaded from entering into any form of long-term agreements due to uncertainty regarding whether the refugees would remain in the area. Thus, for most refugees, the simplest way to survive economically was to find ways to participate in the “aid economy” of the camps through short-term work and petty trade in received rations.

Dispersal and Mobility Under Constraint (1996–1998)

This status quo persisted until 1996 when the AFDL (Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) advanced into eastern Zaire. The huge camps were dismantled and the refugees fled toward places like Kisangani. The entire model for refugee assistance shifted, from static camps to mobile ad-hoc concentration points. As these refugees moved, they faced continual harassment from soldiers and other authority figures (Prunier, 2009). Unfortunately, this led to a return of the 1994 health dynamic, with thousands of people dying due to cholera and other diseases. With the dispersal of the refugees and the virtual collapse of Zairean state, it may be assumed that the refugees would have a chance to economically and socially integrate. This was not the case. Various intermediaries and officials, from various military commanders to police units, to local officials who still maintained a semblance of control, continued to impose restrictions on the refugees and ensured that work rights and safe movement were not guaranteed (Reyntjens, 2009). Crucially, the destruction of the camps did not change the trajectory of refugee selective inclusion; it just changed where it occurred. Relief operations moved from being concentrated in the camps to mobile programs and, as will be discussed next, the urban peripheries. The ongoing dependency on relief organizations and the aid economy did not diminish – it just shifted its venue and became more atomized.

Urbanization and the Rise of Goma’s Aid Economy (1998–2002)

By 1998 humanitarian operations had shifted to the city of Goma. Refugees who had refused repatriation were now dispersed and living on the margins of society. Aid organizations continued to provide a mix of humanitarian assistance that included return support, town-based programs of aid distribution/medical support, and mobile assistance to reach people further in the hinterland (Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010). The policy of authorities did not shift: continuing to consider the refugees as security threats and therefore refused efforts at integration or allowing work and other forms of formalization. What changed was that instead of this dynamic occurring in the camps, it spread to roads, markets, and urban spaces and the rules for making a living were unevenly applied and leveraged as a tool of control.

The start of the Second Congo War in August 1998 turned this uneasy situation upside down. With dozens of belligerents – from other African states to various militias and other armed groups – this conflict would create various areas of control for different groups. These areas were treated as places for revenue extraction to fund the conflict and one of the main ways to do this was through roadblocks, “taxation,” and corridors of control (Raeymaekers, 2002). Refugees already living on the margins of society at the time with few rights were easy targets. Doing everyday tasks such as visiting towns for provisions, or taking goods to markets for sale meant passing armed tolls. This became pervasive within the Kivus and armed men would demand payment in terms of money, timber, charcoal, or food (Schouten et al., 2017). For widely dispersed refugees who depended on trade and short-term menial work these tolls became a form of taxation that forced a continuing hand-to-mouth existence for many.

At the same time, the lawlessness and chaos in the countryside also resulted in international aid agencies clustering within Goma. This shaped the city’s urban political economy. While this did benefit local people, refugees were excluded from sharing in this inflow of money due to their status that forbade any form of long-term work or entering contractual agreements. There were, like in earlier year, short term opportunities but these casual and often just tied to a particular project cycle (Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010). This meant there were clear winners and losers in Goma’s new aid economy. Landlords and traders who were able to enter binding long-term agreements thrived. Refugees who had been frozen out of the formal economy were relegated to bartering and trading on days when aid was distributed or casual labor with no contractual protections.

Even against the backdrop of increased NGO presence in cities like Goma, there was unrelenting pressure from the security regime imposed by both government forces and the various militias. For example, in North Kivu authorities issued a blanket expulsion order for all Rwandan refugees – even threatening those Congolese who had sheltered these refugees – as a means of ensuring that there would be no enduring local settlement:

Governor Kanyamuhanga Gafunzi accused the Hutu refugees of assisting Interahamwe Hutu militias in destabilizing peace and security in both the rebel-held eastern Congo and neighboring Rwanda and of fostering ethnic divisions in Congo. (Rwandan Refugees Ordered Out of Congo | Human Rights Watch, 1999).

The UNHCR was aware of this problem and repeatedly pressed for a process of formalization for the refugees. However it was only in October 2002 that the DRC implemented a law on refugees, meaning for this entire period the refugees existed in a policy gray area and were often abused by authorities due to this lack of legal standing (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014a).

On 17 January 2002, Mount Nyiragongo erupted and sent calamity through Goma, leading to the displacement of a large part of the city’s residents, including refugees. This natural disaster compounded the misery for the refugees and thousands returned to Rwanda. Despite the magnitude of Nyiragongo, legal reform only followed nine months later in October, tied to the national political transition, not the disaster. The final chapter of this phase occurred in mid-late 2002, when a series of bilateral agreements led to the withdrawal of various combatants from Congo. There was also promised action against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe that were present in eastern Congo. On 17 December the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC (Pretoria) led to a power sharing framework in the country and created a plan for peace (Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Parties), 2002).

Implications & Broader Policy Lessons

The selective inclusion of refugees from 1994-2002 endured because the structures and regimes that first created it endured. Forced displacement in the Kivus did not cause society to collapse; it reoriented households, labor markets, urban spaces, and the reach of local authorities (Castles, 2003). What emerged was a dual economy. On the one hand there was the formal economy, where aid organization and people with legal rights (work authorization, ability to enter contractual agreements, right to long term stay) participated. On the other hand there were the refugees, who had few rights and were locked out of the formal economy and forced to survive in a legal vacuum, making them heavily dependent on international aid organizations. This informal sphere was also heavily militarized and refugees were constantly under pressure from local Congolese authorities and former Rwandan military and Interahamwe; these forces governed any form of commerce that ultimately emerged. The destruction of the Goma mega camps and outbreak of the civil war did not fundamentally shift this state of affairs but just moved its venue of control from the camps to roads, markets, and urban compounds. There remained this core interaction between the administrators of international aid (the NGOs) and the forces of securitization and control that forced refugees into the economic margins.

This pattern of selective inclusion is not unique to Congo. Similar dynamics have been observed among Somali refugees in Kenya, where securitized encampment and humanitarian control likewise produced long-term dependency. In both cases, humanitarian governance and state security coalesced to produce parallel economies of care and control, underscoring the structural persistence of selective inclusion across contexts. (Ikanda et al., 2025). The UNHCR later proposed shifting from ‘care and maintenance’ toward lawful mobility and work authorization (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014b). Both of these studies, and the experiences in Congo, seem to indicate that a lack of such integration will result in the eventual formation of an unsustainable aid economy.

Firstly, there needs to be a focus on both relief, in the form of aid, and rights. While national sovereignty needs to be fully respected, by allowing refugees the ability to move and work, even if it is provisionally, dependency will be reduced and the ability of gatekeepers to dominate refugee life will dissipate. In Congo, a lack of these rights meant the aid economy soon became the status quo and authorities could abuse the plight of refugees who had no legal recourse. Joseph Carens explores this idea of so-called “rights bundling” extensively in his article “The Rights of Irregular Migrants,” and makes a compelling case for why it is crucial to avoid a system of selective inclusion by providing rights (Carens, 2008).

Secondly, aid should be connected as much as possible to local markets, rather than existing as a parallel island, cut off from the rest of the economy. How would this look in practice? Refugees should be provided with cash grants that they could use to purchase goods and services from local markets. At the same time, local sellers should be able to purchase and sell aid supplies from aid organizations at discount prices to avoid a situation of price gouging and hoarding. This will reframe aid spending as more akin to a bridge into the national economy, rather than a moat that separates the refugees from the communities they live in (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014).

Finally, there need to be concerted efforts to tackle problems emerging from the militarization within the camps. The Congo shows how selective inclusion invites other, more serious problems like roadblocks, corridor control, and ad-hoc “taxation” by extra-legal and legal authorities when refugees lack rights and an ability to provide for themselves. By increasing the rights that refugees have, governments and aid organizations reduce the rent that can be extracted because refugees are able to provide for themselves and their families without fear of legal repercussions. This reduces the chances of bribery and corruption occurring. Unless refugee governance moves beyond care-and-maintenance models to include rights of movement, work, and participation in national markets, aid economies will continue to reproduce dependency and invite coercion by armed or state actors.

Conclusion

The plight of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo during the period 1994 to 2002 vividly illustrates how selective inclusion is created not through temporary emergencies but rather through the continuing creation of conditions of alienation and dependency. In the Kivus, humanitarian administration by NGOs were crucial to stabilizing a chaotic situation through the delivery of water, food, and medical supplies. However, this stability had a long term cost when it was clear that the refugee situation was not going to resolve itself within a period of months. The Congolese state and various armed actors exacerbated this problem by forcefully separating the refugees from any form of integration and making sure gatekeepers who leveraged connections with broader Congolese society were the ones who profited. This vividly illustrates how the so-called “care and maintenance” model of refugee administration and governance result in unsustainable aid economies that result in vulnerability to securitization and elite capture. This also supports the idea of many academics that certain rights should be granted to refugees in order to prevent selective inclusion resulting in long term permanent marginalization. Comparative evidence from Somali refugees in Kenya shows that the conclusion that emerges from the situation in eastern Congo is by no means unique. The lesson seems clear: unless refugee management couples rights with relief, aid economies will emerge and produce dependency, while leaving refugees exposed to coercion by state and non-state actors. Selective inclusion emerges as a structural mechanism, not a temporary condition, which is produced by the convergence of humanitarian care and state security, and sustained through spatial confinement, legal ambiguity, and economic dependency. This study extends Agier’s notion of humanitarian government by showing that the politics of care and the logic of security are mutually constitutive. The same systems that sustain life also delimit it. From refugee encampments in the Sahel to fortified European borders, the logic of selective inclusion persists. Without the coupling of rights and relief, humanitarianism risks reproducing the very exclusions it seeks to alleviate.