Introduction
War produces media, and media produces war. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, the specter of authoritarian Russia has been used by Western media to justify American intervention in Ukraine. Undoubtedly, aid has been a good thing, but regardless of whether the US should help Ukraine, why are they helping Ukraine? Would America care if it were a country other than Russia? Where was this urgent anti-colonialism when countries disconnected from the battlegrounds of great powers were being conquered? In this paper, I argue that American aid is far more about hurting Russia than it is about helping Ukraine. It is my goal to expose this false generosity and unmask the authentic intentions behind American aid.
Before we probe the current international situation, we must designate a framework to evaluate ethics in international relations. Although American aid has indisputably been consequentially valuable and saved many Ukrainian lives, I argue consequentialism is the wrong guide by which to evaluate ethical value in this context: while what is consequentially or normatively ethical is variable and contingent, the meta-ethical decisionmaking principles that guide action carry over across distinct situations, proving an actor’s intentions are the most salient site for ethical scrutiny. Thus, I will use a deontological intention-based approach that focuses on the intentions behind America’s actions instead of their consequence, which will help me gain insight into America’s authentic priorities. It is my goal to explore the contrast between prioritizing intentions and consequences and examine the events in Ukraine through both lenses.
Homing in on the case study of Russia and Ukraine, I aim to critically analyze the way portrayals of Russia’s evil have shielded America from responsibility. Media narratives that describe Russia’s war crimes have facilitated a relativist framework which determines whether America’s actions are ethical solely by comparing them to what Russia would have done. This narrative forces the false choice of Russia versus America onto political analysts, which shatters the possibility of multifaceted criticism (Ahmed, 2022; Long, 2022). This ultimately obfuscating accountability for colonialism and perpetuating the notion of American moral glory, which may not tell the whole story.
First, I will establish an ethical framing of intentionality as opposed to consequentialism, then I will explain the lesser-of-two-evils false choice posited by recent media, provide an alternative model of critique, and finally examine other possible motives for the US disrupting Russia’s invasion. In this review article, I analyze media works like those by Applebaum, Hoffman, and Hassel et al. as well as utilize moral philosophical theories presented by Zizek, Dillon & Reid, and Bayoumi to synthesize perspectives on the conflict.
Moral Framing
The first step of ethical analysis is deciding upon a system of ethics to guide our thought. Most policymakers and media analysts seem to have settled on consequentialism, the idea that ethical action is determined by its consequences. However, in international relations studies, this is flawed. Considering the high stakes of foreign policy predictions, consequentialism is dangerous because it relies on inductive reasoning: actors assume their actions will have positive consequences because of how similar actions have fared in the past. Unfortunately, that model makes it impossible to tell if an action is ethical until after the action and its potentially negative consequences have occurred. Dillon and Reid term this serial policy failure: the inability to correct policy failures because analysts refuse to test actors’ intentions (Dillon & Reid, 2000). When unethical things occur, a pure consequentialist would never be able to trace their cause, instead only able to make surface-level descriptions and observing that A caused B, instead of understanding why A caused B.
In the context of security policy, a good example of such analysis stems from the media coverage of the Kosovo bombings. There were two competing stories behind NATO’s intervention: one pegged NATO as the “enforcer of the respect for human rights,” while the more realistic narrative framed NATO as an international hegemon fighting for selfish strategic interests, which serendippitously resulted in fighting fascism (Zizek, 1999). The former explanation is easily debunked after examination of many other opportunities to intervene against fascism that NATO had and did not take. If NATO were truly an anti-fascist international hero, how does one explain the simultaneous utter inaction to aid Palestinians in Israel, Kurds in Turkey, etc.? So, even if critics are right that cynics cannot verify what exactly the intentions of an action were, process of elimination makes it easy to discern what the intention was not.
A common criticism of deontological ethics and intentional focus is that it is impossible to certainly locate one’s intention when undertaking an action, but this is a far bigger issue with consequentialism, if anything. There are a few premises for this: the Butterfly Effect, the idea that any action could affect any other action or situation no matter how inconsequential it’s assumed to be, such as a butterfly’s wings drumming up a hurricane across the globe, and the Principle of Intervening Actors, the idea that one cannot be held accountable for how others act in response to their initial action, actions should be judged in a vacuum because there are infinite possible unpredictable responses that could disrupt the initial action’s trajectory (Harris, 2008). Here is an example of this at its extreme: a fascist dictator passes a horrific policy, which causes so much backlash that their regime is overthrown, restoring peace. While the consequence of this dictator’s action ultimately was positive, it is inconceivable to claim their intention was such. Thus, since the consequence is ultimately out of control of the actor, while the intention is the best representation of one’s mindset, the latter should play a larger role in assessing ethics.
Other critics explicitly defend moral relativism: Toal describes it as an unappealing inevitability in the world of international policy analysis, claiming that purifying intentions enacts a constant deference of comparing practical policy options (Agnew et al., 2018). However, there is a distinction between theorizing and policymaking. Academics cannot shape specific policies, but we can guide the epistemological foundation for how the American media and policy approach the international sphere. Thus, scholars with no agency beyond analysis should focus on intentions over consequences; academia is insular enough to test these ideas without facing the consequences of oppression for innocent Ukrainians. Supposedly ‘practical’ policy recommendations only apply to this exact, specific geopolitical situation, which we will never again find ourselves in, so consequential analysis is at best unproductive. However, America’s mindset and priorities will carry over to the future, so they ought to be ethically fine-tuned.
Modern-day coverage of Ukraine
American media’s vilification of Russia as an evil, authoritarian, despotic regime facilitates a lesser-of-two-evils dichotomy between the US and Russia, which posits American international peacekeeping and primacy as a necessary evil in the face of Russia, who is far worse. The issue with this binary is that it gives the US a free pass around criticism because its behavior is not held to ethical standards in a vacuum, but ethical standards established by Russia’s behavior. This writes America a blank check for international behavior insofar as they can do whatever they please and have it considered ethical so long as it is less evil than Russia (Ahmed, 2022). So, even if every description of Russia’s war crime is true, even if they are far worse than America, comparing them as though there is no third option is an unethical form of knowledge production.
This fearmongering can be traced back to the built-up resentment after the Cold War ceased: “In 1994, Moscow was already seething with the language of resentment, aggression, and imperial nostalgia; the Russian state was developing an illiberal vision of the world, and even then was preparing to enforce it,” with other world leaders describing democracy as “under threat” (Applebaum, 2022). An example of this is US activity in the Middle East: as Biden sees it, “the Middle East is a critical theater for great power competition, and partnerships with Arab dictatorships are an advantage in that competition” (Hoffman, 2022). The fears of Russia and China uniting with Middle Eastern nations in an "axis of evil’’ justify US alliances with autocratic regimes as a necessary bulwark against regional chaos.
This is “campism,” a recent resurgence of a Cold War global binary hinged on the US vs Russia, demanding everyone staunchly take one side or the other, with no room to examine the nuance of the situation (Achcar, 2022). This rigid dichotomy eliminates the possibility of cynically investigating both sides, the far more ethical option that manages to keep both great powers in check, because any ally of America is otherwise seen as “someone I should spare from criticism at any rate” (Achcar, 2022).
For instance, in the US-led invasion of Iraq, spectators were caught in a similarly complicated decision: support “one of the Middle East’s most brutal and murderous regimes, one that had even used chemical weapons in massacring thousands of its country’s Kurdish population,” or succumb to the idea that the US is also a brutal global policeman, which led to at least 280,771 innocent Iraqi civilians dying in brutal ways, such as “aerial bombing, shelling, gunshots, suicide attacks, and fires started by bombing” (Achcar, 2022; Iraqi Civilians, 2023). Clearly, America was not in it for the benefit of the Iraqi people or the humanitarian cause, demonstrated by their apathetic and violent attitude towards the civilians entirely disconnected from the violent regime in power.
Another example is Libya under Gaddafi, a brutal dictator who had his people begging for NATO intervention. Yet, when NATO finally heeded their calls, they swiftly killed Gaddafi, wiped out the Libyan military, and withdrew with no aid to the Libyan people, which was the supposed goal of the intervention: to help civilians. The mission was not a humanitarian success; the only result was the political destabilization of a country already suffering in the afterlife of autocracy (Achcar, 2022). The impulse to ask, “which side was more ethical?” is precisely problematic moral relativism: Gaddafi’s Libya being an autocratic regime should not justify American imperial destabilization so long as it’s “not as bad” as the previous regime. Instead, we should raise the bar for what is considered ethical in order to hold all parties accountable for forging a more benevolent world.
The alternative to moral relativism is simple: critique all sides with an ethic of unfaltering skepticism aimed at unmasking international smokescreens that conceal unethical intentions (Dillon & Reid, 2000). While producers of knowledge may not have a direct say in Capitol Hill or the Pentagon, we certainly can influence general public sentiment and electoral trends with hopes of holding even America to higher standards for how the governments conducts itself abroad. If a democracy is a reflection of its constituents’ will, we ought to ensure ours is ethically directed.
Now that we’ve established this, we can ponder, if not altruistic humanitarianism, what motive has the US for involvement in Ukraine? There are a few likely ones: strategic incentives and racial bias. First, strategic incentives: the inevitable desire for international influence and hegemony that necessitates globalization through soft power like Ukrainian aid (Kagan, 2022). President Biden so much as verified this when he said aiding Ukraine matters “because it keeps the peace and prevents open season for would-be aggressors to threaten our security and prosperity” (Hassel et al., 2023). This statement makes clear that Biden’s concern lies not in the Ukrainian lives being taken, but the American lives that may be taken because of the precedent Russia’s unencumbered invasion would set. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “our investment in Ukraine is restoring and rebuilding deterrence for pennies on the dollar” (Hassel et al., 2023). This framing of aid as an investment is a transactionalist mentality that is clearly not charitable or kind-hearted but instead seeks a return on this investment: security for America in the future via deterrence. This is similar to America’s protection of Taiwan: America invests a great deal in aiding their defense efforts because of economic and diplomatic investments on the line (Goldman, 2023; Kagan, 2022). This angle is statistically supported: while 61% of American aid packages have been directed toward military endeavors to offensively battle Russia, including some missions designated to take place on Russia’s turf, disjointed from the Ukraine conflict, a mere 5% have been designated for humanitarian purposes like restoration (Masters & Merrows, 2022). One American media company, the Center for American Progress, states that “rebuilding Ukraine’s economy and its governmental capacity will be critical in the near term to support Ukraine’s capacity to win the war” (Hassel et al., 2023). Restoring Ukraine’s stability is a priority for America, but only for the sake of winning the war, which is a selfish interest for all the reasons above.
Second, racial bias. While it can’t explain why the US wants to help Ukraine, it can explain why it prioritized them over other humanitarian opportunities like Afghanistan and Iraq: the disposability of civilians in Otherized, non-western, non-white countries does not apply to the white man’s burden of saving the innocent, virtuous white citizens of Ukraine (Bayoumi, 2022). In a recent interview, WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus questioned “if the world really gives equal attention to Black and white lives,” citing ongoing crises of similar scale to Ukraine’s in Syria, Afghanistan, and his home country of Ethiopia (Cheng, 2022). Statistically, Ghebreyesus is right: Of the $16 billion USD spent on humanitarian assistance in 2022, $4.4B of it went to Ukraine, a massive 27.5% (Development Initiatives, 2023). However, the Ukraine situation affected 17.7 million people, compared to the 36.4 million of the drought in the Horn of Africa which demanded a mere 11.6% ($1.3 billion), the Sahel climate and government crisis, affecting 34.8 million who received 2% ($311 million), and the “climate hot spot” of Pakistan, struggling through flooding in 2022 that left already weak infrastructure ravaged, affecting 33 million yet receiving an inconsequential 0.3% ($50.1 million) (Concern, 2023; USAID, 2022, USAID, 2023a, USAID, 2023b). Despite Ukraine’s relatively low impact, it’s received so much attention from both the average American and our government - why? Racial biases that perpetuate a value gap of Eurocentricity, fueling exclusive multilateralism that concentrates mutual aid in the global north while ignoring the global south.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the complex interplay between moral philosophy, international relations, and media narrative construction in the context of American involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war. This paper sought to shed light on a more nuanced understanding of America’s presupposed altruistic intervention; first by establishing a deontological intention-based framework for evaluating ethics in foreign policy calculations, then explaining the current conundrum in media coverage of the Ukraine conflict and its ethical implications, and finally, offering alternative possible incentives for America’s rush to involve itself in this conflict.
The intention-based framework advocated in this paper highlights the importance of interrogating the actor’s motivations and ethical mindset, rather than solely evaluating the outcomes of their actions. By scrutinizing intentions, a deeper understanding emerges of the underlying principles that guide a nation’s behavior on the global stage.
The analysis has shown that the portrayal of international events in the media significantly shapes our perceptions of power dynamics and morality, often creating a skewed perspective that obscures the complexities of geopolitical interactions. The media’s tendency to vilify Russia while exalting the US has led to the construction of a lesser-of-two-evils narrative, diverting attention from American historical complicity in colonial annexation.
It is my hope that by critically assessing these motives, the paper encourages a deeper reflection on the ethical dimensions of international actions and the need for a more comprehensive understanding of the motives at play amongst policymakers. This enables positive social transformations that spill out of governance, creating skeptical subjects who question military administrators and hold them to higher standards for international engagement.